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Pierre Hadot (1995, 272), Michel Foucault (2005, 28) and Alexander Nehamas 
(1985, 2000) have all recognised in Nietzsche a continuation of the spirit of 
Hellenistic philosophy, in which philosophy is not simply a theoretical enquiry 
but a way of life.i The advantage of comparing Nietzsche to Hellenistic thinkers, 
such as the Pyrrhonian sceptics, is this brings us to the recognition that the same 
critical method that Nietzsche uses to diagnose a crisis in contemporary Europe 
and demonstrate the need for change also contains the possibility of bringing 
about that change and curing the sickness of modern man. Scepticism is part of 
this cure. Thus, to understand Nietzsche’s statements on scepticism and the role 
that it plays in his philosophy we need to recognise that for Nietzsche scepticism 
is a practical endeavour that has an effect on those who pursue it. This suggests 
an important affinity with Pyrrhonian scepticism. Jessica Berry has recently 
explored this affinity as a way to approach Nietzsche’s philosophy, and while she 
does not claim that Nietzsche is simply a Pyrrhonian sceptic she does argue for 
substantial similarities (2011, 24-25).  
 
The disadvantage of approaching Nietzsche through the lens of Pyrrhonism is 
that it encourages a reading of Nietzsche’s philosophical practice in terms of the 
goal of working on or perfecting a self whose fundamental character is not 
challenged. Of course, some Hellenistic thinkers were critical of social roles and 
behaviour. As A.A. Long suggests, both the Epicureans and the Stoics criticise 
contemporary society because it leads us to ‘neglect a life in agreement with our 
nature.’ (2006, 23) Nietzsche’s criticisms, however, certainly from Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra onwards, run more deeply. For Nietzsche, the human as we know it 
is forged in the context of its social existence. His criticisms of modern culture, or 
the lack of it, and modern man, call for the destruction or ‘going-under’ 
[Untergehen] of the human as it is now. (Z Prologue 4)ii Nietzsche asks ‘for what 
shall ‘man’ as a whole – no longer just one people, one race – be cultivated and 
bred?’ (KSA 11: 37 [8]) He is interested in discovering what ‘given a favourable 
accumulation and intensification of forces, and tasks, could be cultivated out of 
man’. In order ‘to prepare for great enterprises and collective experiments in 
discipline and breeding’ he declares we need ‘new philosophers’ and ‘men of the 
future’ (BGE 203). Hence, while, as I shall discuss below, Nietzsche questions the 
idea of a unified self, the task of breeding a new type operates at the level of the 
individual and requires that those who are up to the task undertake a ‘conscious 
employment of a unity of method’ (BGE 210). In his mature philosophy, 
Nietzsche is not looking for readers who are content to work on and cultivate an 
existing self, but hopes to inspire a select audience to radically transform the self, 
and ultimately to create beings very different from the modern men he saw 
around him.  
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That Nietzsche is concerned with a project of radical self-transformation has 
implications for the particular practices that he advocates, including scepticism. 
Firstly, we find that the practices he would have us take up do not simply work 
on the selves that we currently are but destroy the self as it currently exists. 
Hence, Zarathustra tells us ‘Those who go under I love with my entire love’ (Z III 
12, 6). Those engaging now in practices of self-transformation can only hope to 
be the ancestors of the ultimate end of Nietzsche’s project of transformation. 
This end is the necessarily opaque figure of the overman [Übermensch], who as a 
being beyond what we are now, can only be hinted at from our current 
perspective (Z I Prologue 3,4).iii To set humanity on a path towards the overman 
requires that some individuals let go of the selves they currently are and be open 
to experiment (Z III 25). Thus, the second important implication of Nietzsche’s 
commitment to radical transformation is that the practices of working on the self 
that he advocates involve experiment. The philosophers of the future whom he 
calls for in Beyond Good and Evil ‘will certainly be experimenters’ and ‘as critics 
of body and soul, they like to employ experiment in a new, perhaps wider, 
perhaps more dangerous sense.’ (BGE 210)  Nietzsche, therefore, maintains the 
need for us to explore our drives and passions in order to allow for experiment 
and the creation of new values and new ways of being.  
 
If we turn to the particular example of scepticism, then any account of the role of 
Nietzsche’s scepticism must reconcile the questioning of belief and values that a 
sceptical attitude requires with the need for commitment to new values.  It has 
already been recognised in the literature that this presents a tension with 
Pyrrhonism. Richard Bett rightly stresses that Nietzsche would not accept a 
Pyrrhonian suspension of judgement given that he is ultimately concerned with 
the creation of values, but he does not consider Nietzsche’s scepticism in terms 
of a practice that affects those who take it up and thus prepares them for such 
creation (2000, 79). Andreas Ur Sommer recognises that asserting one’s 
perspectives against other interpretations is part of Nietzsche’s sceptical 
practice, and not merely a limitation on Nietzsche’s scepticism (2006, 267). 
However, his discussion of the role of scepticism is limited to combating existing 
values and beliefs. We need to understand how scepticism has an effect on those 
who practice it which enables new creation. Additionally, this underscores 
another fundamental difference between a Nietzschean and a Pyrrhonian 
Scepticism. I will argue below that for Nietzsche we cannot be truly sceptical 
whilst living as before and following customs because living involves valuing. 
While it has been noted before that the Pyrrhonian following of convention 
sharply contrasts to the spirit of Nietzsche’s thought (Parush, 79, 535), my claim 
is that for Nietzsche it is incompatible with a critical scepticism than can uproot 
our entrenched beliefs and values. To continue to act as before fails to challenge 
the values that these acts instantiate, and the self that is defined by these actions 
and values. A transformative scepticism thus requires that we act differently. 
Further, as acting is a form of evaluation, acting differently means experimenting 
with alternative values. Hence, Nietzsche’s scepticism is experimental not only 
because he advocates the creation of new values but because we cannot 
challenge existing values without experimenting with new ones. 
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Comparing Nietzsche’s sceptical practice to Pyrrhonian scepticism shows how 
distinctive Nietzsche’s scepticism is. Before entering into this comparison, I want 
to set out the key features of Pyrrhonism, or at least the version of it that has 





Much of what we know of ancient Scepticism comes from the writings of Sextus 
Empiricus’ Outlines of Scepticism and Diogenes Laertius’ Lives and Opinions of 
Eminent Philosophers. It is Diogenes Laertius’ text, which Nietzsche references in 
his notebooks and letters,iv though Bett and Jessica Berry both argue that 
Nietzsche’s knowledge of scepticism suggests his reading on ancient scepticism 
went beyond Diogenes, Berry arguing that Nietzsche would have been familiar 
with the work of Sextus Empiricus through his work on Democritus (Bett, 2000, 
67; Berry, 2011, 27-28). Urs Sommer suggests there is no evidence Nietzsche 
read Sextus in the original but cites various surveys of Greek thought that 
Nietzsche did read that discuss ancient scepticism (2006, 259).v A further, late, 
source for Nietzsche was Victor Brochard’s Les Sceptiques Grecs which he read in 
1888 (Brobjer, 2008, 104). Certainly Nietzsche was aware of details of 
Pyrrhonian scepticism from a variety of sources.  
 
It is Sextus Empiricus who gives us our most complete account of Pyrrhonian 
scepticism, so termed because he credits Pyrrho of Elis as the founder of the 
version of scepticism that he is presenting and advocating. I will, therefore, rely 
principally on his Outlines of Scepticism to sketch an account of Pyrrhonian 
scepticism that we can use as a counterpoint to our analysis of Nietzsche’s own 
version of a practical scepticism. 
 
At its core Pyrrhonian scepticism is the suspension of judgement. According to 
Sextus: 
 
Scepticism is an ability to set out oppositions among things which appear 
and are thought in any way at all, an ability by which, because of the 
equipollence in the opposed objects and accounts, we come first to a 
suspension of judgement and afterwards to tranquillity. (PH I 8)vi 
 
Pyrrhonian sceptics cultivate the ability to see that one account or description of 
something is always equally compelling as another. Thus ‘the intellect is 
suspended so as neither to posit nor to reject anything because of the 
equipollence of the matters being investigated.’ (PH I 196)  
 
The problem this immediately raises is how we can live in this state of 
suspended judgement. Surely we make various judgements when we operate in 
the world, both practical conditional assumptions, such as not picking up hot 
metal if we don’t want to burn our hands, and value judgements, such as it being 
good to avoid burning our hands. Whether Sextus is claiming that the sceptic can 
live without any belief is debated within the secondary literature.  
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One way that sceptics may be said to have beliefs is if they believe that they have 
certain experiences. Whether when sceptics say, ‘I am in pain’, or ‘I am hot’, they 
are reporting a belief about having an experience or whether, as Jonathan Barnes 
claims, they simply report or avow their experiences or feelings, is not 
something that we need to decide for the purposes of this discussion (1998, 66). 
Even if we allow that sceptics affirm that they have experiences, if they make no 
judgement concerning whether these experiences are of anything, or whether 
they are good or bad, it is still not clear how they are to live and make practical 
choices. It is problematic whether appearance alone can operate as a criterion 
for action, as the sceptics claim it can. As Diogenes Laertius reports: ‘the 
apparent is the Sceptic's criterion, as indeed Aenesidemus says; and so does 
Epicurus. Democritus, however, denied that any apparent fact could be a 
criterion, indeed he denied the very existence of the apparent.’ (DL IX 106)vii  
 
Michael Frede argues we should not restrict the Pyrrhonians’ beliefs to the fact 
that they have experiences, claiming that Sextus only rules out a certain kind of 
belief. On Frede’s reading the beliefs denied to the sceptic are those Sextus 
describes in PH I, 13 as ‘assent to some unclear object of investigation in the 
sciences’, but sceptics can have beliefs about things that are simply evident to us 
and not arrived at rationally (1998, 18). Against Frede, Myles Burnyeat, Barnes, 
and Vogt all offer alternative interpretations of PH I 13 that can be reconciled 
with passages that imply the sceptic affirms nothing about the world (PH I 15, 24, 
192).viii  I will argue below that Nietzsche’s scepticism is incompatible with both 
interpretations of Sextus’ scepticism. Even if Frede is right about Sextus’ 
intentions, however, for the purposes of assessing whether Nietzsche can be 
seen to be taking up a version of Pyrrhonian Scepticism, the reception of 
Pyrrhonian ideas in the sources he would have encountered is perhaps what is 
most pertinent. Contemporary opponents to Pyrrhonism took it to be impractical 
because it required one to live with no beliefs about the world, hence the 
caricature of Pyrrho taking no heed of hazards and being followed by his friends 
to keep him from harm’s way (DL IX 62). As Diogenes Laertius reports it ‘the 
dogmatic philosophers maintain that the Sceptics do away with life itself, in that 
they reject all that life consists in’ (DL IX 104). Pyrrhonism as it was debated in 
the ancient world, does seem to present the practical problem of how we can live 
without affirming anything about the world. 
 
Sextus was well aware of the longstanding objection that scepticism did not 
allow one to act.ix In response he says the sceptics: ‘attending to what is apparent, 
live in accordance with everyday observances, without holding opinions – for we 
are not able to be utterly inactive.’ (PH I 23)x They ‘follow laws and customs and 
natural feelings, and so live without holding opinions.’  (PH I 231) Or as Diogenes 
Laertius puts it ‘we may chose a thing or shrink from a thing by habit and may 
observe rules and customs.’ (DL IX 108) Thus, sceptics drink when they feel the 
impulsion of thirst, and pull their hand away from hot metal when they feel pain, 
without any need for a belief as to whether it is really hot. They also avoid 
picking up a piece of metal from the fire, following ‘recollective signs’ (PH II 
102).xi Sceptics will get dressed in the morning and obey the law, not wander 
naked in the streets. Sextus allows further that they can employ the practical 
expertise they have acquired (PH I 24). However, as a sceptic he insists that ‘we 
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do not call anything good or bad with the thought that what we say is plausible – 
rather, without holding opinions we follow ordinary life in order not to be 
inactive’ (PH I 226). Sceptics, he claims, go along with things, in the sense of 
‘yielding without adherence’ (PH I 230), letting themselves be guided practically 
without making any judgement.   
 
What then is the advantage of acquiring the sceptical ability of withholding 
judgment? It is the practical concern of tranquillity. Sextus suggests that initially 
the sceptics examined matters that were undecided in the hope of finding the 
truth and thereby achieving tranquillity, but after seeing that the positions in the 
dispute were equipollent ‘they suspended judgement, tranquillity followed as it 
were fortuitously, as a shadow follows a body.’ (PH I 27) This description is 
echoed in Diogenes Laertius’ Lives. ‘The end to be realised they hold to be 
suspension of judgement, which brings with it tranquillity like a shadow.’ (DL IX 
107) The claim then is that the sceptics chance upon the happy accident that 
once one accepts that ‘objects appear to us equal in respect of convincingness 
and lack of convincingness’ (PH I 196), this brings with it tranquillity. The sceptic 
is still affected by physical feelings but this too is made easier by not taking them 
to be bad in themselves: ‘those who make no determination about what is good 
and bad by nature neither avoid nor pursue anything with intensity; and hence 
they are tranquil.’ (PH I 28) Thus, ‘the aim of Sceptics is tranquillity in matters of 
opinion and moderation of feeling in matters forced upon [them].’ (PH I 25)  
 
The Problem of Nietzsche’s Scepticism 
 
Let us turn now to scepticism as it appears in Nietzsche’s thought. As with many 
key concepts in Nietzsche’s philosophy, his discussions of scepticism present us 
with a tension. We find both high praise and severe criticism of scepticism. On 
the one hand in The Anti-Christ we encounter the claim ‘Great spirits [Geister] are 
sceptics. Zarathustra is a sceptic. The vigour of the spirit [Geistes], its freedom 
through strength and superior strength, is proved by scepticism.’ (AC 54)xii On 
the other, in his Untimely Meditations Nietzsche describes ‘a hopeless sea of 
scepticism’ (UT II 10), and we find in Beyond Good and Evil the assertion that 
‘scepticism is the most spiritual expression of a certain complex physiological 
condition called in ordinary language nervous debility and sickness’ (BGE 208). 
 
Jessica Berry’s explanation of this tension is that it is a modern scepticism which 
following Descartes is fundamentally epistemological in its concerns that 
Nietzsche rejects, advocating instead a scepticism that is broadly Pyrrhonian in 
character (2011, 33-34).xiii Certainly, Nietzsche talks about different kinds of 
scepticism, contrasting the weak scepticism he attacks in Beyond Good and Evil 
208 to ‘a new and stronger species of scepticism’ (BGE 209). So we need to 
clarify what kind of scepticism it is that Nietzsche advocates and how it differs 
from the scepticism of ‘nervous debility and sickness’. But is Nietzsche’s stronger 
and healthier scepticism Pyrrhonian in character to the extent that Berry claims? 
 
Scepticism and Transformation 
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Any attempt to understand the nature of Nietzsche’s scepticism must recognise 
that it has a therapeutic role in that it is in some sense aimed at making us 
healthy or curing a sickness.xiv Sextus claims that ‘Sceptics are philanthropic and 
wish to cure by argument, as far as they can, the conceit and rashness of the 
Dogmatists.’ (PH III 280) In turn, Nietzsche claims that his own philosophical 
journey has operated as a kind of self-cure. Describing Human all too Human, 
Nietzsche claims that here he was concerned with the question of the value of 
morality and in particular of the ‘unegoistic’ as deified by Schopenhauer: 
 
against these very instincts I gave vent to an increasingly deep mistrust, a 
scepticism which dug deeper and deeper! Precisely here I saw the great 
danger to mankind its most sublime temptation and seduction – 
temptation to what? To nothingness? – precisely here I saw the beginning 
of the end, standstill, mankind looking back wearily, turning its will 
against life, and the onset of the final sickness becoming gently, sadly 
manifest. (GM Preface 5) 
  
It was, Nietzsche claims, his scepticism that cured him of the influence of 
Schopenhauer, allowing him to realise that Schopenhauer’s philosophy was 
another incarnation of the ascetic ideal. His scepticism, by showing him the 
emptiness of this romantic ideal, had a curative effect enabling him, as he claims 
in Ecce Homo, to ‘To look from a morbid perspective towards healthier concepts 
and values,’ (EH Wise 1).  
 
For Nietzsche, scepticism, in the sense of questioning and challenging our 
existing beliefs and values, is needed to combat, including in himself, the sickness 
associated with all incarnations of what he terms the ascetic ideal. Nietzsche 
recognises that dogmatic faith is not limited to religion but continues in new 
forms of the ascetic ideal that criticise its previous incarnations. He traces this 
ideal from Plato’s forms, through Christianity, on into the philosophy of Kant and 
Schopenhauer, where the ‘real’ world is deified even as it is set out of reach of 
knowledge, and finally into science and the critics of religion who make truth 
their new idol (TI Fable, GM III 24). These philosophies are ascetic ideals because 
they all share an absolute faith in absolute value, and at the same time devalue 
the world at hand, ascetically denying the body, and instead nihilistically valuing 
an empty illusion. Even science, because of its dogmatic insistence on the value 
of objectivity, is a form of withdrawal from the body by virtue of its denial of the 
particularity of our perspectives. Hence, science ‘is not the opposite of the ascetic 
ideal but the latter’s own most recent and noble manifestation.’ (GM III: 23) For 
Nietzsche, as for the Pyrrhonians, all forms of fanatical belief are identified as 
pathological.xv The dogmatists need their idols and are unable to let go of them. 
 
Scepticism, as Berry (2011), and before her Daniel Conway and Julie Ward, have 
noted (1992),xvi is thus a prescription designed to combat the pathology of 
dogmatism for Nietzsche as for Sextus. What, however, is the health that the 
pathological is opposed to? The aim in Pyrrhonian scepticism, as we have seen, is 
tranquillity. Berry admits that a passive notion of tranquillity is clearly not 
something that Nietzsche would advocate (2011, 139). In her attempt to fit 
Nietzsche into the model of Pyrrhonism, she therefore turns to Democritus, 
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suggesting that in his notion of ‘cheerfulness’ we find a goal for scepticism that 
Nietzsche would be able to embrace.  Importantly, Berry here recognises that 
cheerfulness will have different meanings for different types, and suggests that 
Nietzsche’s concern is that we learn a robust cheerfulness as part of a critical 
project that leads to health (2011, 172).  
 
However, her claim that in the attainment of this cheerfulness, ‘suspension of 
judgement, is not a means to an end; it is the end’ cannot be applied to Nietzsche 
(Berry, 2011, 179). Firstly, as I will argue below, Nietzsche does not think such 
suspension is possible if this is understood as living without any beliefs or values, 
or adequate if it is understood less radically. Further, as an end it would not be 
desirable. Certainly Berry is right that Nietzsche cannot want to simply replace 
the fanaticism of the ascetic ideal with new beliefs that we are fanatical about 
and are dependent on. He does, however, call for the creation of new values as 
part of overcoming who we are. He demands that we ‘limit ourselves to the 
purification of our opinions and value judgements’ but also ‘to the creation of 
tables of what is good that are new and all our own’ (GS 335).  In the Anti-Christ 
he declares that ‘each one of us should devise his own virtue, his own categorical 
imperative.’ (AC 11) While the future philosophers he calls for in Beyond Good 
and Evil must be ‘law-givers’ whose task is to ‘create values’ (211). Thus, for 
Nietzsche, scepticism is part of a radical revaluation of values and 
transformation in who we are. This radical aim is lost if we go too far in reducing 
Nietzsche’s scepticism to a Pyrrhonian scepticism, and with it the character of 
Nietzsche’s sceptical practice is also misunderstood. I will now set out how 
Nietzsche’s experimental scepticism is a tool of transformation.  
 
Scepticism and Action 
 
We have seen that the Pyrrhonians live by acting in accordance with natural 
feelings and existing laws and beliefs. In Les Sceptiques Grecs, a book that 
Nietzsche describes as excellent (EH Klug 3), Victor Brochard connects this 
practical acceptance of the precepts of the community with following common 
sense, claiming that: 
 
In practice, the sage must live like everybody, he conforms to laws, to 
customs, to the religion of his country. He sticks to common sense, and 
does as others, here is the rule that following Pyrrho all the sceptics have 
adopted. It is by a strange irony of destiny that their doctrine is so often 
fought and mocked in the name of common sense; one of their principle 
preoccupations was in fact to not offend common sense. (1887, 59)  
 
This interpretation suggests an obvious tension between Pyrrhonism and 
Nietzsche’s polemical criticisms of herd thinking and correlating praise of 
solitude.xvii In Beyond Good and Evil, when discussing the free spirit as a positive 
figure Nietzsche says: ‘born, sworn, jealous friends of solitude, of our own 
deepest, most midnight, most midday solitude – such a type of man are we, we 
free spirits!’ (BGE 44) These solitary free spirits contrast to Nietzsche’s 
description in his notebooks of ‘the herd animals and apostles of equality 
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wrongly called ‘free spirits’’, of whom he says ‘not a single one (…) would be able 
to endure loneliness.’ (KSA 12 3[13])  
 
The obvious tension between Nietzsche’s criticism of herd thinkers and call for 
solitude, and Sextus’ claim that one can follow common morality and customs in 
practice while withholding judgement as to their value, reflects a deeper 
difference in their understanding of the relationship between making evaluative 
judgements and acting. For Nietzsche, the belief that something is of value, 
cannot be separated from our actions in the way that, on most readings, the 
Pyrrhonians seem to suggest. He is not claiming that we necessarily hold a 
conscious belief or judgement prior to acting. In acting, however, we assert that 
this action is worthwhile: ‘life itself forces us to establish values’ (TI Morality as 
Anti-nature: 5), ‘to live man must evaluate’ (KSA 11 26[118]), ‘Is living not 
valuating, preferring, being unjust, being limited, wanting to be different?’ (BGE 
9), ‘no people could live without first evaluating’ (Z I: 15) and ‘All actions may be 
traced back to evaluations’ (D II 104). This does not always correspond to 
conscious assent to an evaluative proposition. Nietzsche’s claim is that in 
choosing a course of action, in being a certain kind of person, we both express 
and are driven by an evaluative standpoint that is fundamental to who we are: 
‘Our intellect, our will likewise our feelings are dependent on our valuations: 
these correspond to our drives and the conditions of their existence.’ (KSA 11: 
p.661) Without these valuations we would be incapable of action. Thus, given 
Nietzsche does not think it is possible to live without evaluating, a Nietzschean 
scepticism cannot be characterised as having no beliefs, or being totally detached.  
 
It might seem that questioning our belief system while acting as before is exactly 
what the crowd in the market place, who do not understand the madman’s 
speech when he claims we have killed God and wiped ‘away the entire horizon’ 
(GS 125), the free thinkers who still belief in altruism (KSA 12 10[170]),xviii or the 
failed free spirits committed to the unconditional value of truth (GM III 24), are 
doing. They claim to no longer believe in God yet still adhere to Christian 
morality. Nietzsche’s claim, however, is that their actions show that they remain 
committed to the ascetic ideal in a new form. Thus, belief in the ascetic ideal is 
not truly undermined so long as we still live by it. Were we to finally give up this 
ideal we would face a crisis of nihilism (KSA 12 5[71]). Once our ideals have been 
exposed as illusions, and we no longer judge, and ultimately no longer feel, 
something to be true or good, we cannot live by them. Hence Nietzsche’s warning 
that the consumption of Kant might lead to ‘gnawing and disintegrating 
scepticism and relativism’  (HH I 261).  
 
Given Nietzsche’s interest in transforming who we are, he is concerned that we 
question the valuations that exist at the level of our drives and condition our 
actions. We cannot truly question our values, and their incorporation into the 
kind of self we are, whilst living according to the customs or habits which 
instantiate them. If Frede’s reading is right and Sextus does not suggest the 
sceptic gives up everyday beliefs (rather than beliefs about how things are in 
themselves), then this only shows more starkly that Pyrrhonian scepticism does 
not go far enough for Nietzsche. If scepticism does not question the beliefs and 
values we employ when we act, which underscore who are, then it is toothless 
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when it comes to forging a new way of living and being. It is precisely the 
evaluations we live by and the beliefs that form who we are, in some cases 
unconsciously, that Nietzsche wants to challenge in his version of scepticism. For 
Nietzsche, living differently is therefore integral to scepticism itself. It is only by 
trying out new practices and cultivating the capacity to detach and move 
between different evaluative standpoints that we are able to question these 
standpoints. 
 
If on the other hand contra Frede Sextus is claiming that the sceptic can live 
according to custom without having any beliefs, Nietzsche would maintain that 
sceptic demonstrates in their actions that there are still attached to the customs 
and laws which they follow and still asserting these values. The sceptic who 
claims to make no judgements and be totally detached is deluded. Again 
scepticism fails to be sufficiently radical for Nietzsche. Nietzsche is concerned 
not just to challenge our surface beliefs but to challenge our way of acting and 
being, and thus the judgements they instantiate.  
 
Because genuine scepticism wrenches us from our customary way of being and 
common way of thinking and acting we need the ability to endure solitude. Our 
scepticism must work in partnership with a capacity to do without our 
connection with those who share the way of being and thinking that our 
scepticism undermines. An inability to endure loneliness implies a 
corresponding inability to pursue critical inquiry to the point where it threatens 
the beliefs that bind us to the community, and as Brochard puts it ‘offends 
common sense’. A capacity for solitude is not only necessary to see the 
implications of scepticism through but the practice of solitude, involving 
stepping out of our customary habits, and away from the ‘sociability’ with which 
we ‘deafen ourselves’ (UT III 5), can help to break our attachment to our beliefs 
and escape the common way of living. Hence, solitude can also help develop our 
sceptical capacity precisely because it involves stepping out of the habitual 
behaviour of following customs, which for Nietzsche cannot be disentangled 
from holding a belief or having values.  
 
Scepticism, is therefore necessarily experimental for Nietzsche. An association he 
makes both in the Gay Science and in notes from 1880 and 1885: ‘I approve of 
any form of scepticism to which I can reply, ‘Let’s try it!’ But I want to hear 
nothing more about all the things and questions which don’t admit of 
experiment.’ (GS 51); ‘Scepticism! Yes, but a scepticism of experiments! Not the 
inertia of despair’ (KSA 9 6[356]); ‘Our actions are, given we are sceptics, 
experiments’ (KSA 9 6[442]); If actions are always, as Nietzsche suggests, 
evaluations, then we must try out different actions in order to become detached 
from the beliefs and values we currently take as certain. It is not just that we use 
different interpretations to challenge each other, but that we can only become 
detached from our entrenched beliefs and value standpoints if we try out other 
standpoints, because total detachment is not possible. This experimental 





Scepticism and Going-under 
 
It is not just our way of life but who we are that is intimately connected to what 
we believe. In the Nachlass, Nietzsche describes ‘man as a multiplicity of “wills to 
power”: each one with a multiplicity of means of expression and forms’ (KSA 12: 
1[58]). Thus, for Nietzsche there is no ‘pure, will-less, painless, timeless, subject 
of knowledge’ (GM III:12), and the self consists of contingent and unstable 
hierarchies of wills to power, constantly interpreting and asserting their 
interpretation and evaluation. On Nietzsche’s hypothesis,xix in which there is no 
unitary ‘subject’ but rather a complex and fluid self that consists of a multiplicity 
of wills to power, where is the agency that takes up a transformative sceptical 
practice? Agency does not need to be stable or simple. We do not have to accept 
the account of agency as a doer that stands behind an action associated with the 
idea of the subject that Nietzsche puts into question, suggesting: ‘the “subject” is 
not something given but a fiction added on, tucked behind’ (KSA 12: 7[60]). 
Various practices can be taken up, and shaped, by different wills to power, or 
groups of wills to power at different times. These wills to power form part of the 
changing organisation that makes up the self. The real problem then is not so 
much a lack of agency as an excess of it. What unites the various agencies as a 
self who leads one life? This unity will not be a simple or given unity, of the sort 
Nietzsche rejects as an illusion. Rather it is a complex, constructed and changing 
unity. For Nietzsche, there cannot be just one model of what will count as a 
unified self. There is no self that exists prior to or beyond its activity and 
commitments. It is these commitments and actions that establish an appearance 
of unity even while multiple agencies are operating.  
 
It is our beliefs and values, or illusions as Nietzsche would allege, that form the 
horizons that make living a life possible: ‘we have arranged for ourselves a world 
in which we are able to live’ (GS 121). If we dismantle this world, we cannot 
continue to live as we currently are. It is not possible to continue our current 
existence without the horizons of belief it depends on. Hence, Nietzsche claims 
that when: 
 
Something you formerly loved as a truth or a probability now strikes you 
as an error; you cast it off and believe your reason has made a victory. But 
maybe that error was necessary for you then, when you were still another 
person (GS 307). 
 
It is because our life depends on the beliefs that form the horizons within which 
we act that Nietzsche sees scepticism as so dangerous, claiming that ‘every great 
degree of caution in inferring, every sceptical disposition, is a great danger to life’ 
(GS 111). It is also, however, precisely because of this that developing scepticism 
is so important for Nietzsche. The practice of scepticism opens up the possibility 
of transformation. Nietzsche claims ‘for humans alone among the animals there 
are no eternal horizons and perspectives.’ (GS 143) Concerning our religious and 
metaphysical searches, Nietzsche declares that: ‘We have absolutely no need of 
these certainties regarding the furthest horizon to live a full and excellent human 
life.’ (HH II VS 16) Our metaphysical need is ‘a need that has come into existence 
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and consequently also a transient one’ (HH I 131). The sceptic can, therefore, 
overcome this need.  
 
However, though he would have us overcome our attachment to morality and 
our need for the furthest horizons, Nietzsche, does not think we can do without 
all horizons. Nietzsche contends that ‘A living thing can be healthy, strong and 
fruitful only within a horizon.’ (UM II 1) It is not, therefore, a case of eradicating 
all beliefs and values but rather of developing a capacity to detach from them 
that also allows for the creation of new values. Let us turn now to the creative 
part of Nietzsche’s project  
 
Scepticism and Engagement 
 
Nietzsche welcomes the destruction of existing beliefs and values as a clearing of 
our current horizons, and with it the going-under of our current self, but he 
recognises the need for the creation of new values and new horizons, if a new 
self is to emerge. Thus, after science has ‘proved that it can take such goals away 
and annihilate them’ an ‘experimenting would be in order, in which every kind of 
heroism could find satisfaction – an experimenting that might last for centuries.’ 
(GS 7) Nietzsche’s scepticism, therefore, is a partner to this creative 
experimentation. We have already seen how Nietzsche rejects the possibility of a 
total suspension of judgement, if this is understood to mean we affirm nothing, 
and thus challenging the beliefs we have previously relied on is necessarily 
experimental in that it cannot avoid trying out new evaluative stances.  
   
An experimental scepticism which engages with the body also opens the way to 
new creation. This is why, as has been noted previously, Nietzsche contrasts his 
scepticism to a weak, passive scepticism of despair and withdrawal, of which he 
accuses Pyrrho (Bett, 2000, 78; Urs Sommer, 2006, 265; Parush, 1976, 537). 
Experimental scepticism, is the scepticism of strong spirits who are ready for the 
task of new creation, and who are not weary as Nietzsche claims Pyrrho was, 
writing: ‘What inspired the Sceptics? Hatred against the Dogmatists – or a need 
for calm, a weariness as with Pyrrho.’  (KSA 13 15[58]) 
 
It is important to stress that Nietzsche’s version of scepticism must be opposed 
to those who claim objectivity or impartiality. Objectivity in this sense is merely 
an illusion given ‘there is only a perspectival seeing, only a perspectival knowing’ 
(GM III 12). As Berry notes, the objective men exhibit a dishonest self-denial and 
are incapable of owning their own perspectives (2011, 115). Nietzsche’s 
scepticism in contrast must be rooted in self-awareness and accept the 
inescapability of perspectives.   
 
However, Nietzsche’s concern that we own our perspectives goes beyond the 
idea of accepting that we cannot obtain a view from nowhere. Nietzsche objects 
to the objective man not just for failing to acknowledge the presence of his 
perspectives but for failing to assert them. He is opposed to the way in which the 
objective man is cheerful in the sense of being untroubled by deep feeling: ‘he is 
cheerful, not because he has no troubles but because he has no fingers and 
facility for dealing with his troubles.’ (BGE 207) He bemoans his ‘perilous 
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unconcernedness over Yes and No’ and that such a man ‘no longer knows how to 
affirm or deny; he does not command neither does he destroy.’ (BGE 207)  
 
Nietzsche’s criticism of an ability to affirm or deny would seem then to apply not 
just to the objective men of his day but also to Sextus’ description of the 
Pyrrhonian cultivation of equipollence leading to the suspension of judgement 
because one is  ‘at a loss whether to assent or deny’ (PH I 7). Nietzsche’s attack 
on the superficial cheerfulness of the objective man could also be levelled against 
Pyrrhonian sceptics given Sextus’ claim that sceptics ‘follow the observance of 
everyday life without holding opinions. They therefore remain without feeling in 
matters of opinion and with moderation of feeling in matters forced upon them’ 
(PH III 234). As Burnyeat suggests, to live as Sextus proposes is to live without 
taking ownership of the principles of our actions and thus ‘the withdrawal from 
truth and real existence becomes, in a certain sense a detachment from oneself.’ 
(1998, 41) 
 
It is true that in Human All Too Human Nietzsche praises indifference, writing: 
‘What is now needed in regard to these things is not knowledge against faith but 
indifference against faith and supposed knowledge in these domains.’ (HH II VS 
16) This is not, however, a general indifference that Nietzsche is praising, but 
only indifference to the inaccessible spheres of metaphysics and religion, where 
we have searched for universal meaning. It is clear that Nietzsche is opposed to a 
version of scepticism too indifferent to be able to affirm or deny and that he sees 
this as form of sickness or weakness. In Beyond Good and Evil Nietzsche 
vehemently attacks a scepticism that comes from a weak constitution. 
 
Against this kind of ‘good will’ – a will to the actual active denial of life – 
there is today confessedly no better sedative and soporific than 
scepticism […] the sceptic, that delicate creature is all too easily 
frightened; his conscience is schooled to wince at every No, indeed even 
at a hard decisive Yes, and to sense something like a sting […] scepticism 
is the most spiritual expression of a certain complex physiological 
condition called in ordinary language nervous debility and sickness. (BGE 
208) 
 
Nietzsche’s strong sceptic, on the other hand, is not moderate in feeling, rather 
he allows himself  ‘the great method for acquiring knowledge [Erkenntniss]: he 
feels many pros and cons’ (KSA 11 26[119]), and engages with as wide a range of 
feelings as possible: ‘We must proceed experimentally with things, be sometimes 
angry, sometimes affectionate toward them and allow justice, passion, and 
coldness toward them to follow one upon the other.’ (D 432) Nietzsche’s sceptic 
takes ownership of their feelings and learns to get control over [his] ‘For and 
Against’ (HH I Preface 6). It is a scepticism out of which one can claim to emerge 
‘more courageous and healthier than ever, once more in possession of [one’s] 
instincts’ (D 477).  
 
This engagement with our ‘pros and cons’ is a prerequisite for creation. It is only 
by living in and knowing our own drives, that we will be able to find and affirm 
new values. It is also, as we have seen, as prerequisite for genuine scepticism, 
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because it is only by engaging with the range of evaluative standpoints within us 
and acting differently that we can detach from the values instantiated in our 
habitual practices. This necessary sensualism is opposed to the philosophical 
pair Nietzsche couples in a late note: ‘Socrates. Pyrrho. The idiosyncrasy of the 
philosophers against the senses.’ (KSA 13 15[5])  
 
This concern for a healthy engagement with the body in contrast to a need for 
withdrawal is a theme that extends beyond scepticism in Nietzsche. When 
Nietzsche accuses Pyrrho of décadence, he also throws Epicurus in with the set of 
decadent types. (KSA 13 14[99]) Nietzsche’s criticisms in his late work of both 
the Epicureans and Stoics echo his criticisms of weak scepticism that is 
motivated by a need for calm, and an inability to accept and engage with one’s 
bodily drives. When Nietzsche attacks moralities of self-control, stoicism, with its 
metaphor of the self as a fortress, seems to be the target. Such moralities, he 
alleges, cannot allow man to ‘entrust himself to any instinct’ and having ‘turned 
himself into a fortress’ he is ‘impoverished and cut off from the most beautiful 
fortuities of the soul’ (GS 305). The Stoics, Nietzsche proceeds in the next 
aphorism to claim, train themselves to be insensitive while the Epicureans avoid 
what they are sensitive to.  
 
The Epicurean seeks out the situation, the persons, and even the events 
that suit his extremely sensitive intellectual constitution; he forgoes the 
rest – that is, almost everything – because it would be too strong and 
heavy a diet. The Stoic, by contrast, trains himself to swallow stones and 
worms, glass shards and scorpions without nausea, he wants his stomach 
to be ultimately insensible to everything the chance of existence pours 
into him- (GS 306).  
 
In both cases there is an incapacity to digest, a failure to own our own passions 
that Nietzsche’s strong experimental type is opposed to, because this incapacity 
deprives us of the material for experimentation in the creation of new values and 
the possibility of affirming and committing to these values.xx  
 
Nietzsche’s praise of solitude might seem to fit with the Epicurean Garden but he 
comes to oppose this particular notion of withdrawal from society. The 
Epicurean, at least as Nietzsche chooses to represent him in his later work, 
withdraws selectively from what he finds difficult. Martha Nussbaum suggests 
that in the Garden the Epicureans have made ‘an entire counter-culture that will 
fill every corner of daily life.’ (2009, 294) Withdrawal to the Garden is not the 
painful exile that Nietzsche describes in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, where the spirit 
is thirsty for what it has cut itself off from, but strong enough to endure and 
resist drinking form the oasis that it spies: 
 
In the yellow sands and burned by the sun he will squint thirstily at the 
islands rich in springs, where living beings repose beneath dark trees.  
But his thirst does not persuade him to become like those comfortable 
creatures: for where there are oases, there are also images of idols. 
(Z II On the Famous Wise Men) 
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Rather, Nietzsche comes to portray Epicurean withdrawal as a withdrawal 
driven by weakness, to which we can apply his earlier criticisms of a solitude 
that renounces (D 440), and which therefore lacks the basis for experiment that 
his creative project demands.  
 
Crucially then, experimental scepticism involves the capacity to do without 
certainty, and let go of beliefs, but not an incapacity for strong convictions and 
passions as Nietzsche, in his late work, portrays not only the Pyrrhonian sceptics 
but also the Epicureans and Stoics.xxi The sceptical capacity to detach must be 
distinguished from an incapacity to attach or engage. When Nietzsche describes 
the strength of a capacity for freedom from convictions in the Anti-Christ he 
continues: 
 
Grand Passion, the ground and force of his being, even more enlightened, 
more despotic than he himself is, takes his whole intellect into its service; 
it makes him intrepid; it even gives him the courage for unholy means; if 
need be it permits him convictions, (AC 56).  
 
Nietzsche wants us to embrace our going-under as a means to new creation. 
When we let go of our beliefs we experiment with new ways of valuing and new 
ways of being.   
 
we are living either a preliminary or a posterior existence, depending on 
taste and talent, and it is best in this interregnum to be every possible 
extent our own reges and to found little experimental nations. We are 




The capacity to be our ‘own reges’ (D 453) and rule over ourselves, affirming our 
‘own categorical imperative’ (AC 11), must be distinguished from holding on to 
principles out of a need for conviction. Nietzsche declares: ‘Freedom from 
convictions of any kind, the capacity for an unconstrained view pertains to 
strength.’ (AC 54) The new experimental values we assert must be something 
that we can affirm passionately, yet be able to let go of. This passion involves an 
engagement with the evaluative perspectives, or drives, within us. It requires 
that we be prepared to feel our pros and cons (KSA 11 26[119]). To experiment 
in values is to allow the hierarchy between our drives, their interaction and thus 
their development and character, to change. Hence, it is to allow ourselves to 
change. The horizons of our new selves should not become unquestionable and 
rigid. Nietzsche has set us the experimental task of finding a way to inhabit a 
given perspective and commit to values without taking them to be absolute. To 
be a Nietzschean sceptic one must overcome one’s need for absolute ideals.  
 
This applies even to one’s commitment to scepticism. The sceptic needs to 
cultivate the ability to become detached from everything including their 
scepticism. Hence, Berry is right to emphasise that Nietzsche opposes a form of 
scepticism that turns into a form of dogmatism. The danger that scepticism will 
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become a new attachment is one that Nietzsche is all too aware of, warning that 
one should even be careful not to ‘cleave to one’s detachment’ (BGE 41).  
 
How do we distinguish between fanaticism and this new form of commitment? 
Firstly, the fanatic takes the values they hold to be universal and permanent. In 
contrast, Nietzsche’s men of the future can affirm their values as their own. This 
involves self-awareness. Both the fanatics’ claim to have transcended the 
particularity of our perspectives through belief in a transcendent ideal and the 
Pyrrhonian claim to be able to suspend judgement all together are forms of self-
delusion. Whether a self-awareness that acknowledges the constant presence of 
evaluations rooted in our bodily drives and expressed in all our actions has been 
achieved is not something that can be identified from the outside. It is rather a 
question of our own intellectual conscience and a constant process of self-
examination. In addition to intellectual conscience, the right kind of commitment 
will involve embracing the particularlity and impermanence of our values. 
Therefore, the need for external values to give meaning to our actions must be 
overcome. We detach not just, however, from particular evaluative standpoints 
but from a particular self, or configuration of these standpoints. Detachment 
from our beliefs and values is thus also a willingness to go-under. Then it 
becomes possible to take ‘delight’ in ‘self-determination’ (GS 437). This joyful 
attitude is another hallmark of the type of commitment Nietzsche wants us to 
achieve. This contrasts to the weariness that Nietzsche identifies both in 
Pyrrhonian scepticism and in the need for faith that it superficially contrasts to, 
of which he says ‘around all these positivistic systems hover the fumes of a 
certain pessimistic gloom, something of a weariness, fatalism, disappointment’ 
(GS 347). The nature of an alternative, joyful commitment, must remain to some 
extent open ended, as it will be the product of an experiment which will 
fundamentally change us. What Nietzsche offers us is a description of the types, 
who fail to achieve this, not an archetype of the figure who does.  
 
The right kind of scepticism for Nietzsche, is neither simply a stage that clears 
the way to the creation of new values and this new form of commitment, nor an 
end in itself, a new unquestionable ideal and need. We must, incorporate the 
sceptic’s ability to do without certainty and let go of our ideals. We can then 
apply an experimental scepticism as an antidote to entrenched beliefs, when life 
needs it, just as Nietzsche argued in On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for 
Life that we need to know when to apply a destructive critical history (UT II). 
Where in this early essay Nietzsche emphasised the need to balance critical 
history, the late Nietzsche throws himself behind the importance of attacking the 
persistence of the ascetic ideal. It remains the case, however, that this sceptical 
attack must be rooted in life’s needs. To deny the evaluative character of any 
actions including a sceptical attack on existing values is a form of delusion. If 
instead we embrace and engage with the many valuing drives within us, learning 
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ii Neither Hadot or Foucault are setting out to develop a detailed analysis of 
Nietzsche’s thought based on this insight. Nehamas offers an interpretation of 
Nietzsche’s thought as an art of living that employs a literary model (1985).  
Nehamas’ important work does not address the role of scepticism, which is my 
focus here, and more generally does not explain what techniques allow the 
modern man to become emancipated from current conditions before his is able 
to give style to his character.  
ii Nietzsche citations are made using the following abbreviations, with section 
number or title where applicable and aphorism number indicated: The Untimely 
Meditations (UT), Human, all Too Human (HH), Daybreak (D), The Gay Science 
(GS), Thus Spoke Zarathustra (Z), On the Genealogy of Morality (GM), Beyond Good 
and Evil (BGE), Twilight of the Idols (TI), The Anti-Christ (AC), Ecce Homo (EH), 
Kritische Studienausgabe von Giorgio Colli und Mazzino Montinari (KSA). 
Translations used are listed in the references.   
iii The importance of the Overman in Nietzsche’s thought does not rest on Thus 
Spoke Zarathustra Alone. In On the Genealogy of Morality, Nietzsche refers to the 
‘man of the future’, who can overcome nihilism, as a ‘bell-stroke of noon’ who 
‘gives back to earth its goal’ (GM II: 24) which clearly connects this figure to 
overman of  ‘the great noontide of earth and man’ (Z III: 13, 2) who is ‘the sense 
of the earth’ (Z Prologue: 3). Paul Loeb has also argued that the second essay of 
On the Genealogy of Morality can only be understood in the context of Nietzsche’s 
philosophy of the Übermensch (2005). 
iv For example KSA (7 31[10], 32[76]) 
v Nietzsche read the first volume of  Friedrich Überweg’s Grundriss der Geschichte 
der Philosophie von Thales bis auf die Gegenwart, in 1865, and E Zeller’s Die 
Philosophie der Griechen in inhrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung dargestellt in 1867 
(Brobjer, 2008, 257-258), both of which contain discussions of Sextus Empiricus. 
vi Citations from Outlines to Scepticism are cited with the abbreviation PH, book 
number and Fabrician section numbers.  
vii  Citations from The Lives of Eminent Philosophers are cited using the 
abbreviation DL, book number and section number. 
viii Burnyeat sums up his objections to Frede’s reading in the following: ‘I do not 
think that one solitary reference to the sciences (for it is not repeated elsewhere 
in Sextus) in a definition borrowed from someone else is sufficient basis to credit 
Sextus with a distinction between dogmatic and non-dogmatic belief. It is not 
sufficient even when we add to the scales that Sextus frequently restricts what 
he suspends judgement about to the question how things are “in nature” (pros 
tēn phusin etc., PH I 59,78,87, et al.) or how things are “so far as concerns what 
the dogmatists say about them” (PH II 26, 104, III 13, 39, 135, M VIII 3) or, 
ambiguously, how things are “so far as this is a matter for logos (statement 
definition, reason)” (PH I 20, 215). Just how restrictive these qualifications are 
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depends on what they are contrasted with, and in every case the contrast is with 
how things appear, where this, as we have seen, is to be taken non-epistemically. 
All we are left with, then, is a passive impression (phantasia) or experience 
(pathos), expressed in a statement which makes no truth-claim about what is the 
case.’ (1998, 51) Barnes argument is that given it is clear that the sceptic rejects 
all philosophical or theoretical tenets, the sceptic can have no theory of truth. 
They cannot then make ordinary judgements that something is the case, such as 
the water is hot, as this depends on a criterion of truth (1998, 78). More recently 
Vogt has argued that in this passage Sextus is concerned with whether the 
sceptic has any teachings: ‘The question of whether the sceptic dogmatizes leads 
Sextus to discuss whether central pieces of sceptical philosophy – the sceptical 
formulae – are doctrinal teachings. This assessment fits well with the way in 
which Sextus, quite generally, keeps doxa and dogma apart, using these words 
and their cognates in different contexts: dogmatikôs when he refers to 
philosophical claims, and adoxastôs when he describes the sceptic’s life […] 
Sextus says that there is a general sense of ‘dogma’ – a kind of acquiescing – that 
figures in the sceptic’s life. As I see it, this is how the formulae (and other 
thoughts central to the sceptic’s philosophy) can linger in the sceptic’s mind, 
without her having accepted them as true.’ (2012, 656) She suggests further that 
if Sextus follows the understanding of belief that is used by his opponents, the 
Stoics and Epicureans, then we can take his claim that sceptics do not posit or 
reject anything, and thus make no judgements, to mean they have no beliefs 
(Vogt, 2012, 654). 
ix For the history of the claim that we cannot live without belief see Burnyeat 
(1998, 27, n 4). 
x Appearance for Sextus refers to impressions and generally includes not just 
sense impressions but also objects of thought. (Burnyeat, 1998, 38, Vogt, 2012, 
659) 
xi Here whether no belief is involved, in ‘assenting without opinion’ to what 
‘everyday life’ ‘finds convincing’ seems more controversial (PH II 102) it sounds 
like, when we take smoke to indicate fire and divert our route accordingly, we 
may have a belief based in experience. Barnes suggests there could be an account 
that does not rely on inference, and thus belief, but notes Sextus does not give it 
(1998, 87-88). Here the notion of habit, which Diogenes Laertius refers to, could 
be taken to be what allows us to connect the smoke and fire and act accordingly.  
If, however, belief is involved in our use of signs, this still leaves many beliefs, 
including normative beliefs, which the sceptic has to explain how we can do 
without when acting.  
xii Translation altered 
xiii Descartes is of course concerned not simply with abstract conditions of 
knowledge but with the experience of doubt, but the aim of an individual taking 
up the method of doubt is to arrive at solid foundations for knowledge. As he 
writes in the First Meditation: ‘I realized that it was necessary, once in the course 
of life, to demolish everything completely and start again right from the 
foundations if I wanted to establish anything at all in the sciences that was stable 
and likely to last.’  (1988, 76) 
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xiv Michael Ure and Keith Ansell-Pearson have both explored Nietzsche’s 
philosophy in terms of a therapeutic practice (Ansell-Pearson, 2013, 97; Ure, 
2008)  
xv Bernard Reginster highlights Nietzsche’s opposition to fanaticism, considering 
it in the context of his ideal of the free spirit. Reginster argues that Nietzsche 
ceases to see a commitment to truth as definitive of the free spirit because, as he 
expresses in GM III, 24, he comes to recognise this commitment as itself a form of 
fanaticism (2003). I consider GM III, 24, to indicate rather Nietzsche’s awareness 
of the tension between the need to pursue enquiry without any limitation on 
where it will take us and the inevitability of presuppositions, including the value 
of such enquiry. However, as I have argued elsewhere, he does not give up on the 
goal of navigating this tension as part of a free spirited pursuit of truth, even if he 
comes to hold that it has not yet been successfully navigated and thus that the 
right kind of free spirits have not yet emerged (----). 
xvi Conway and Ward argue that both Nietzsche and Sextus use self-refutation as 
a deliberate therapeutic practice, operating from within the dogmatic paradigm 
(1992, 193-4).  
xvii It is true that Nietzsche makes a seemingly positive claim in the context of his 
reference to Brochard that the sceptics were honourable. As with Christ, who 
Nietzsche also praises in his late work, because he practiced his life according to 
his own instinct, as ‘consequences of one instinct’ (AC 33), Nietzsche can admire 
the sceptics and still use them as an important counterpoint to the type that he 
hopes will emerge. Nietzsche may be praising the ancient sceptics here because 
they put into practice their theories, but as with Christ, he can maintain that this 
practice expresses a decadent nature, and is thus the wrong kind of scepticism. 
xviii ‘the mild and lily-livered concept ‘humanity’ à la Comte and after Stuart Mill 
[…] Is once again the cult of Christian morality under a new name… the 
freethinkers, e.g. Guyau’ (KSA 12: 10[170])  
xix In the context of Nietzsche’s sceptical attitude his view of the self must be 
taken as a hypothesis he is trying out and as open to revision. I discuss the 
problem of how we can know the activity of unconscious and multiple drives in -
------- and explore the broader question of the status of Nietzsche’s hypothesis of 
the will to power in the context of his perspectivism in--------------- 
xx Keith Ansell-Pearson argues that in his middle work Nietzsche admires 
Epicurus for letting his passions grow modest, rather than seeing him as 
indifferent to passions (2013, 100-101)  
xxi Conway and Ward argue that Sextus’ attitude to the passions contrasts to the 
Stoics precisely because he takes passions to be essential to life (1992, 213). The 
Pyrrhonian passive approach to the passions, however, in which they move one 
without being affirmed, or felt strongly, is still open to the accusation that they 
do not own and fully engage with drives and thus will not be able to experiment 
with new values as Nietzsche’s project requires.   
